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COMMENT ON PROFESSOR LEWIS' PAPER
ROBERT

F.

DRINAN, SJ.*

T IS interesting to locate and analyze the few statements made in the opinions
of the United States Supreme Court on the role which law should play with
regard to racial prejudice. In Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 the Supreme Court
in a seven to one majority stated that:
legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based on physical differences .... If one race be inferior
to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put
them upon the same plane.'
Some twenty years before this decision a seven to two majority of the
same Court was much more positive in endorsing the view that a law based
on prejudice can deepen feelings of bias. In ruling against a state law excluding
Negroes from juries the Supreme Court in 1879 stated that such a law
is practically a brand upon them (Negroes), affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which
is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal
justice which the law aims to secure to all others. 2
Legal mandates from the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government today seek at least to remove any state-aided "stimulant to .. .
race prejudice." Whether the removal of such stimulants will help "to
eradicate racial instincts" is not the province of the jurist but rather of the
social psychologist.
The task of eliminating any state-assisted "stimulant to race prejudice"
is translatable in 1963 in the words "regulating discrimination in places of
public accommodation." In discussing the latter topic it seems important to
this observer to keep always in mind the fact that the law in forbidding discrimination has a double purpose; the law insists on equality of treatment
while at the same time it seeks to eliminate a "stimulant to raceprejudice."
In Professor Lewis' most ably argued presentation there is a thorough
analysis of these purposes of the law. In an attempt to add at least a new
dimension to the excellent and exhaustive paper of Professor Lewis this commentator raises the.following questions:
(1) Is the concept of "expectations" of service advanced by Professor Lewis a valuable thesis to support legal regulation of discrimination in places of public accommodations?
(2) How concerned should we be with the universality and the immediate enforceability of laws to ban bias in public accommodations?
(3) Can laws regulating discrimination in places of public accommoDean, Boston College Law School.
1. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896). (Emphasis added.)
2. Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). (Emphasis added.)
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dation be completely understood or appreciated without an acknowledgement of the inescapable moral basis for such laws?
I.

CoMMoN EXPECTATIONS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS

Professor Lewis asserts quite correctly that an "attempt to capture in
words a standard of equality . . . leads naturally to the language of expectations." 3 While the notion of expectations of service in places of public accommodations has a probative and cogent force its use as a means to measure the
extent to which legally enforced equality will be granted may be somewhat
treacherous. In the first place the concept of the expectation to be served in a
privately owned place of public accommodation is to some extent the product
of an aggressive system of capitalistic enterprise. The expectation which the
public in general may have of receiving service in what are termed "public
accommodations" is always subject to the built-in protective caveat-"we reserve the right to refuse service to anyone."
While this restriction which every owner of a privately operated facility
openly or implicitly expresses to his customers has little relevance to the vast
majority of white customers it indicates nonetheless that the average private
owner of a store or motel would probably not agree that his business in a
literal sense is a place of "public accommodation."
Even more fundamental, however, is the fact that the expectation of
receiving service which the average person has would most probably not be
identified by the ordinary citizen as a moral or legal or constitutional right but
merely as the result of the general invitation of merchants and hotel keepers
to patronize their facilities. In other words the expectations which the average
purchaser has of receiving service is based more on his status as a good customer than as a citizen entitled to enjoy equality in those accommodations
which, because of some state involvement in their regulation, are deemed
to be "public."
Finally the explication of the principle of equality in terms of common
expectations 'could lead to a contraction of the universality implicit in the
concept of "equal protection" as those words are understood in the Fourteenth
Amendment.

II. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF LAWs BANNING DISCRIMINATION
IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS

It is clear that the enactment of a law totally at odds with the sentiments
of the citizens to whom the law will be applicable is not always sound public
policy. A consensus of considerable proportion is a prerequisite for the successful enforcement of any law.
In the matter of regulating the operation of private prejudices in public
accommodations, however, the law confronts a task which it has never had
3.

Lewis, at 437-38.

DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
occasion to meet before. Consequently no one can be certain as to how much
consensus, if any, is required before a statute to desegregate places of public
accommodations will be successful.
Professor Lewis' paper makes reference to the desirability of securing
"the sympathetic support of the largest number of people, including especially
enforcement officials." 4 But it may be that in discussing the role of law in
regulating discrimination in places of public accommodation more emphasis
should be placed on the educative function of law.
The relation of law to public opinion involves complex imponderables.
There is, however, ever more impressive evidence that the law is the most effective teacher in America in forming Negro-white relationships. We should recall
the words of Professor Dicey who, in the last century in his well-known lectures
on law and public opinion stated: "No facts play a more important part in the
creation of opinion than laws themselves."
It may be that a law with conciliatory machinery to work out compliance
or even a simple declaration of public policy would be sometimes advisable.
as a first step toward integration. In any event the enormous educational
impact which every law and every judicial opinion has on the thinking of the
community should be thoroughly understood by those who are seeking a more
profound understanding of the function and potential of law as a means of
obtaining an integrated society.
A further point most worthy of consideration involves the question of
whether any court decision should ever again incorporate the condition "with
all deliberate speed" into its decree. If the United States Supreme Court
follows the decision made in November 1963 by the Delaware Supreme Court
and rules that law enforcement officials may not be utilized to remove nonwhite citizens from places of public accommodations there will automatically
arise the question of the immediacy of the applicability of this decree. Presumably the ruling would be applicable on a universal basis "forthwith" and not
on a "deliberate speed" timetable. It may be that jurists contemplating the
role of law in changing the mores of a prejudiced society should give detailed
consideration to the advantages and disadvantages of a legislative or judicial
decree which would order desegregation of all public accommodations forthwith.
III. Tmn MORAL BASIS OF

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION

Professor Lewis' thorough treatment of every legal and constitutional
aspect of the role of law in combating discrimination does not even by implication omit the inescapable moral foundations on which law and particularly
civil rights legislation is based. But after reading Professor Lewis' carefully
reasoned article on all the arguments which can be employed to buttress the
case for anti-discrimination legislation one is left with the overwhelming impression that in the ultimate analysis the law which seeks to correct the bias of
4.

Id. at 438.
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a prejudiced society is in effect the establishment of "one set of values against
another"--to use Dean Roscoe Pound's phrase.
Those who oppose legislation designed to inhibit prejudice show by the
vehemence of their opposition that they understand that their own deeply held
moral values are being rejected as inferior to the values that are sought to be
established in the legislation which they oppose.
Professor Lewis notes perceptively 5 that those who argue that almost any
state action will turn a privately owned and operated business into a public
accommodation seem to rely on a "mechanistic jurisprudence." The advocates
of coverage by anti-discrimination legislation of virtually every state licensee
tend to assume the existence of a certain pre-existing moral right on the part
of every citizen to be treated with total equality. If the case law does not show
this, these proponents appear to urge, then basic justice or fundamental
morality vindicates such a right.
Both the proponents and opponents of civil rights legislation very often
"csmuggle" in some of their own moral principles. As is done so often in controversies over the role of law the debate employs the terms of constitutional
history but the argument actually centers on the most fundamental presuppositions concerning the purposes of man and of human society. One does not
have to debate anti-discrimination legislation very long before one realizes
that the struggle really does not center on the Fourteenth Amendment but
rather on the complex relationship between law and morality in a pluralistic
democratic society. It is to be hoped that Professor Lewis' discerning paper
will lead its readers to the even more difficult but more important area of the
role of the moral order in fashioning the legal institutions of American society.
5. Id. at 413-14.

